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fI Introduction
The essence of the modern professional soldier lies m  his coroorate 
management of violence [1] The professional soldier is dedicated to the study 
of the risks and opportunities of war, he is subject to political guidance, and 
he has a conservative, realistic outlook on both war and life He is reluctant 
to go to war —  knowing better than the amateur the risks that war entails —  
but he is insistent upon preparedness for war The modern officer is a 
bureaucratized intellectual who devotes much of his time to learning his 
profession this is necessary because the nature of the profession changes as 
one reaches its higher levels Tactical and battlefield considerations are then 
supplanted by political, social, economic, and psychological factors Above 
all, the professional soldier is a universal type —  like the doctor or engineer 
—  and can be found in all parts of the world Despite national variations, the 
professionalism of a particular officer corps can be measured against this 
abstract, universal model, for the model is derived from the nature of the task, 
the management of violence it is not time or culture bound
The Indian officer corps closely follows this type [2] Not all officers 
are Clausewitzes or Auchinlecks, and there is a good deal of time-serving, 
corruption, and incompetence, but the hard kernel of professionals is there, and 
they have found their way to higher ranks in as great numbers as their 
counterparts in other professional military systems This is remarkable, 
considering the fate of most other post-colonial military establishments It 
means that the Indian military (and, still to a considerable degree, the 
Pakistani military) are able to adapt to changing military circumstances, that 
they have a balanced understanding of their role in state and society, and that 
they have the ability to remedy professional defects In the words of a popular
219th Century military metaphor, the professional officer remains the 'brain1 of 
the military, able to direct its legs and arms, and when necessary, able to 
recreate and transform those appendages to meet changing resources and 
circumstances
There is abundant evidence to support this characterization of the Indian 
military as professional Their own internal publications —  journals, books, 
and studies written by and for the officer corps —  demonstrate not only a 
fairly high order of professional skill but an attentiveness to military 
developments elsewhere in the world The model of the Indian military appears 
to be the better Western military establishments, although they remain aware of 
their own unique historic structures and problems Indeed, in some areas, such 
as counter-insurgency and high-altitude warfare they have had as much experience 
as any other military
In historic and comparative terms, this military establishment is something 
of a puzzle While most "developing"[3] states have undergone extended periods 
of military rule, civilian control over the Indian military remains 
unchallenged While one institution after another has been Indianized, the 
services retain many trappings left over from the British Raj, m  an era of 
democratic equalitarlanism, the Indian army has many caste-based units recruited 
from the so-called "martial races 1 The mos recent paradox arises from the 
military's expanded role in governing Assam and Punjab there are at least 40 
million Indians living under de facto martial law, making India one of the 
world's largest military dictatorships, while it is simultaneously the world's 
largest democracy
To some, these anomalies suggest the lirminent breakdown of the Indian 
political system Outside observers, and some Indians, have been arguing for
3many years that a coup is likely, impending, or inevitable More realistically, 
one can observe the slow expansion of military influence within the Indian 
political system, although that influence is considerably less than one 
encounters m  several industrial democracies, most notably the U b One can 
also observe tne militarization of Indian political discourse, and the growtn or 
an enormous military - industrial - politicai complex
Tnese examples suggest several important uncages ana tne neea for a oroaa 
definition of Lue uerm consti tut±un ' «s for the formej., xt is xmpo^tant to 
remember that there are innumerable contacts between the military and the 
broader society which supports and sustains it, and which it is sworn to defend 
The armed forces deal with peasants and presidents, «,xth tillage caste 
structures and nuclear delivery systems, they manipulate public opinion and they 
are ultra-sensitive to that opinion, they draw their resources from Indian 
society, and they make important technical and cultural contributions to that 
society These are not discrete, watertight activities military intervention 
in several of India's neighbors was triggered by a variety of strategic, 
political, orofessional, and social causes, not merely the disobedience or 
ambition of a few generals
Similarly, the term "constitution1 has several different meanings One 
refers to the formal, written document that contains a set of rules and 
procedures by which the Indian people governs itself This "Constitution of 
India" has explicit and important references to the military However, another 
"constitution' refers to the unwritten social and ideological underpinnings of a 
society —  what is sometimes referred to as "political culture "[4] The two are 
intertwined The formal political document is worthless unless sustained by 
values and resources present m  the broader political culture, the latter,
4however, can be gradually modified by laws and acts, and such laws and acts can 
be powerful deterrents in the right political environment
zile do not regard the present role of the Indian military as anomalous, 
although it certainly is unique in many ways It is not an historic accident, 
but the product of careful planning It has not been static, but has undergone 
significant structural and doctrinal change What remains an open question, 
however, is whether the pattern of gradual, adaptive change will continue 
Recent events suggest it may not, and highlight the importance of a fresh look 
at the Indian military
—  The salience of the military's coercive dominance within India has been 
recently dramatized with the breakdown of police and paramilitary forces m  
several states, after a major attempt to insulate the armed forces from civil 
disorder When thousands of Sikh soldiers themselves mutinied after the 
occupation of the Golden Temple, the fragility of the barrier between a unified 
and a disintegrated India —  and the military's vital role in maintaining that 
barrier —  was emphasized as never before since 1947
—  India's external security environment remains unsettled Leaving aside the 
armed stalemate with China and the recent war scare with Pakistan (which 
emanated largely fron the Indian side), new problems have arisen with Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh, and after five years, the Soviet Union has increased military 
activity m  that part of South Asia that it occupies
—  Events elsewhere in South Asia suggest vulnerabilities in India's own 
political culture Since 1970 there have been extended spells of martial law in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh Since India is itself undergoing some of the same 
stresses that led to military rule m  both of these states, it is important to 
note the similarities and differences between thorn, not only for the sake of
5understanding India, but because its neighbors look to India as a model 
—  Finally, certain recent events have had a direct and dramatic impact upon the 
military, and may have far reacmng consequences It is hard to say which of 
these is most significant the murder of Mrs Gandhi, the mutiny of Sikh 
soldiers, the development of a Khalistan movement, direct military rule in the 
Punjao, and the continuing arms race with Pakistan A host of minor events and 
trends have taken their toll as well the bypassing of paramilitary forces in 
quelling riots m  Bombay, the dramatic increase in retired unemployed 
servicemen, irregularities in senior promotions, controversy over caste 
recruitment to the army, and a protracted struggle by all three armed services 
to improve the quality and quantity of their weapons in order to implement new, 
offensive military doctrines
While this chapter will touch upon most of these events and problems, our 
central theme and perspective will remain that of the military itself In the 
final analysis, it is the restraint of the armed forces that allows civilian 
control, pluralist politics, and democratic civil liberties to survive, if not 
thrive, in India Our central concern is less how the military defends the 
Indian state from internal and external threats than the mechanisms, values, and 
procedures which have limited its political role, even as it has become 
socially, economically, and culturally more important
We are —  with one exception —  not concerned with the social composition 
or caste structure of the larger military establishment, as this does not bear 
directly upon the political and constitutional role of the armed force The 
important exception is the reduced recruitment of Sikhs, a process which became 
a Sikh grievance and a matter of special concern to same Sikh officers
6Finally, because of India's special qualities, certain comparative insights 
may be useful India is a democratic, poor, federal system, it is South Asian, 
pluralist, and multi-lingual, it shares in the British imoerial and colonial 
traditions, it is surrounded by powerful and sometimes hostile neighbors, as 
well as weak and dependent ones, it could easily acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability and is also, in places, economically and technologically advanced 
The role that its military plays is not exactly comparable to any other state, 
but there are important structural, ideological, economic, and strategic points 
m  common with Pakistan, the U S , Bangladesh, China, Israel, and others 
Pakistan has a similar army, but different political context, Israel has a 
similar political system, but a different kind of army, China is the right size 
and economic level, but differs in ideology and political structure We shall 
be attentive to comparisons throughout this chapter not only for purposes of 
explication, but because of the special achievements of India's civilnmilitary
structure
7II The Indian Officer Corps A Group Biography
Since the future political role of the military is ultimately dependent 
upon the restraint (or intervention) of the officer corps, it is vital that we 
describe that officer corps This task is simplified by the fact that the 
officer corps is itself a formal bureaucracy, and thus slow to change Its 
members have written extensively about the social, bureaucratic, and even 
political problems they face We can also draw inferences about the impact of 
particular major events or trends, basing our analysis upon known consequences 
in other military establishments It is thus possible to treat the Indian 
military as a kind of extended, historical family, in which succeeding 
generations undergo somewhat different experiences while sharing certain key 
familial characteristics The major age and rank groups constitute successive 
military generations Some of the critical historic events that shaped them are 
summarized m  Figure 1
The British Trained Generations, 1920-47
While the Indian army and navy can trace their origins back to the 18th 
Century, Indians were not brought m  as King's Commissioned Officers (KCO) until 
the 1920s, and then m  very small numbers They were followed by Indian 
Commissioned Officers (ICO) trained m  India after 1932 [5] The present Indian 
military establishment is led entirely by officers recruited and trained in 
independent India Indeed, the oulk of them entered after 1962-3, when the army 
was almost tripled m  size
The KCOs imbibed a number of lessons from the British which are still 
relevant They came to view India from the "top" down, this was easy for many
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8of them who had themselves come from aristocratic or elite families They 
adopted an all-India perspective at a time when India did not exist as a unified 
state They regarded their role as ensuring internal and external security for 
the entire subcontinent, and thought in sub-continental terms
The KCOs and ICOs were taught that the manpower of the Indian Army was
second to none —  that if properly led, the Indian soldier was the finest in the
world, and that this leadership amounted to a trust, almost a religious 
obligation Earning the respect of his troops was the highest aspiration of a 
young officer, British or Indian, a situation which still exists m  considerable 
measure today and which is unparalleled in the non-Western world [6] No other
armies except for India and Pakistan have managed to carry on this mystical bond
so far into independence and turn it to their organizational advantage
Finally, the Indian officer learned early that "politics" (in the partisan 
sense) were to be kept out of the mess, particularly since such politics were 
likely to be a major source of trouble and grief for the army The Indian Army 
was —  in the 1960s —  the only force standing behind the Indian police in case 
of civil disorder, and was frequently called in for "aid to the civil power' 
duty This sometimes meant disaster relief, but more often meant quelling a 
political or religious n o t  and restoring order Indian officers and their men 
saw first-hand the consequences of massive civil disorder m  the inter-war 
period, the broader lesson was that India was so vast and disorderly a country, 
that they would have a hard time managing it They were taught that the army 
should remain above politics, if not, it could be torn apart in an instant by 
sectarian differences and then nothing would keep India from anarchy This view 
remains central to the belief system of Indian officers (and Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis as well) it obviously warns against involvement m  politics, but
9it did —  in Pakistan and Bangladesh —  encourage involvement when the military 
came to believe that their own organization was being contaminated by political 
rot
From 1932 onwards Indians were no longer trained at Sandhurst, but at the 
Indian Military Academy, Dehru Dun They we e not eligible to command British 
troops, and their pay and perquisites were on a lower scale than that of the 
KCO They differed m  other ways as well As the Indianized units became 
clogged with Indian officers their contact with the British declined, few had 
ever been abroad, and they tended to come from less affluent families, and were 
persuaded to join the Indian Army not for prestige or glory, but for material or 
narrow careerist reasons Young Indians who joined the army from 1932 onward 
were more influenced by nationalist currents, although few had any thoughts of 
revolution from within the military establishment Yet, the day did come m  
World War II when a number of them joined the Germans and Japanese, taking their 
troops with them, and turned against the British and fellow Indians
The Indian National Army was not a historical anomaly, but revealed one 
circumstance under which the Indian Army could be suborned [7] The Germans and 
Japanese appealed to Indian nationalism, and were eventually to have the support 
of Subhas Chandra Bose, Nehru's great rival But the I N A  was formed by Mohan 
Singh, an I C 0 , before Bose came over to the Axis powers Mohan Singh wanted 
to liberate India, he built the I N A  along secular lines, breaking down the 
caste and religious structure of the Indian Army and narrowing the gap between 
officer and sepoy The I N A  experiment worked well as a political movement, 
but met with disaster when put to the test of combat
All of the British and most of the Indian officers of this period were 
strongly anti-I N A , chiefly because they felt that the I N A  officers had
10
betrayed their oath of allegiance Later generations of Indian Army officers 
have quite a different view of Bose and the I N A  The I N A  legend was 
cultivated by Indira Gandhi, and younger officers now regard the movement as 
patriotic and just This reveals a sharp decline m  support for classic notions 
of military honor, the meaning of a personal oath, and the military profession 
in India and is reflected in the current controversy about the fate of those 
Sikh soldiers who mutinied after the invasion of the Golden Temple
The Post-War Generations
There was no great rush to join the armed forces after 1947 The fact that 
the Indian military was "national' did not substantially change geographical 
recruitment patterns Officers still came mostly from the Punjab a sampling 
of the cadets in the National Defense Academy in the mid-50s indicated that the 
Punjabis remained about a third of all entrants, with nearby Delhi supplying 
about 159-, and Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Mysore and Kerala supplying less than 5s 
each, and West Bengal and Andhra less than 1% each m  some years [8]
However, all close observers of the Indian military have concluded that 
there has been a precipitous drop in the social status of the armed services and 
a change in the kind of person that becomes an officer the causes for this are 
easy to list the suspicions of Nehru towards the military, the downgrading of 
the military m  the official order of precedence, the severance of a direct 
association with the British, the decline in pay, working conditions, and 
general quality of life, and the subordination of national defense to a foreign 
policy which relied more on diplomacy than military force
This situation changed somewhat when the army (and, to a lesser extent, the 
air force) was rapidly increased in size just after the 1962 conflict with
11
China Patriotic young Indians rushed to join the armed services in large 
numbers, and many mediocre officers who were not purged after the 1962 disaster 
found themselves rapidly oromoted to higher rank The increase in officer slots 
from 1962 to 1973 increased by 50- for lieutenant-generals to three hundred 
percent for lieutenant-colonels, and all officer slots above that rank increased 
by an average of 266-
This "Chinese" generation of officers are now all in the process of 
retiring only a few senior officers will stay on In turn, this means that 
the number of officers who do not reach colonel (or even lieutenant-colonel) is 
dramatically increasing Every year about 55,000 weapons-trained personnel 
leave the military for civilian life While the strength of the Indian Army is 
now about 850,000, there are a minimum of 990,000 retired soldiers, not counting 
former members of the paramilitary forces [9] An increasing number of these are 
officers, who were temporarily accommodated in the army by a 1980 expansion of 
higher ranks These m  turn were the first members of the big group of officers 
who had entered in 1962-3 The army also changed the ratio of staff to command 
posts (reportedly from a ratio of 1 1 to 1 2), creating a bulge of officers with 
no units to command who will find it difficult to achieve promotion [10] The 
problems of sane retired officers and jawans are acute, especially when they 
have not acquired any civilian-relevant skills They will constitute a 
well-trained, dissatisfied, and increasingly large body of ex-soldiers [11]
Bright young Indians from "good" families have stayed away fron the 
military, especially the army for years At the elite private schools the first 
preference for graduates (after a college education) has becane foreign firms 
and then Indian private firms In their place have come the sons of 
Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) and Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO)
12
If this is a trend, it may have one important social-political consequence 
It will complete the breakdown of the elitist character of the officer corps, 
especially in the army More precisely, it will be one generation removed from 
the peasantry, as the largest single category of entrant into the NDA and IMA 
are sons of NCOs and JCOs, who have themselves spent several years of service as 
other ranks Just as the special rank of JCO is retained in India (and 
Pakistan) to provide the OR with an opportunity for social mobility, the ICO is 
increasingly seen as the upward route for his ablest son The problem of social 
decline has been extensively studied by the military itself, and very senior 
officers openly describe the intellectual calibre of leadership material 
attracted to the armed forces (especially the army) as 'intellectually 
mediocre "[12]
The decline m  the formal status of the Indian Army officer has been fully 
documented in the military's own journals Before independence, a secretary in 
the government of India ranked below a lieutenant-general, afterwards, he came 
to rank with a full general The COAS ranked with the judges of the Suoreme 
Court in 1948 but was senior to chief ministers outside their states or the 
Secretary General, GOI By 1951 the Chief became junior to the judges of the 
Supreme Court, and by 1963 was made junior not only to Chief Ministers outside 
their states but even to the Cabinet secretary and Secretary General, "not 
withstanding the fact that the latter's emoluments are less "[13] The 
inequities exist at lower ranks as well In the late sixties a major with 
fifteen years of service would have less seniority than a police officer with 
six years of service, and if the two were working together (as in the Border 
Security Force, officered by the police) the former would be subordinated to the
latter
13
The career opportunities in the Indian Administrative Service are now much 
better than those for an Indian Army officer An analysis by one of India's 
leading soldier-scholars, the then Brigadier S K Sinha, ooints out that every 
one of the 3,000 IAS officers is bound to become Commissioner or Collector m  
twenty years and achieve the statutory status of a major-general Compared with 
the pyramidal structure of the armed forces, the IAS and police are rectangular 
m  shape As an army officer will only be guaranteed of reaching 
lieutenant-colonel in twenty-four years, the IAS cadre, one tenth the size of 
the officer corps, has seme fifty appointments at secretary-level equitable with 
the army's sole general slot [14]
A follow-up study noted that the situation had actually worsened after the 
1971 war when the Chiefs of the three service staffs were placed below the 
Comptroller and Auditor General and lieutenant generals were placed below the 
chief secretaries of states (even though one might be a corps commander with 
responsibility for the defense of half a dozen states) [15] Further, individual 
states can establish their own warrant of precedence for officers of the rank of 
brigadier and below, some created "ludicrous anomalies' In Tamilnadu, Bihar 
and Orissa a brigadier is now ranked above a deputy commissioner and IAS 
officers with less than 25 years of service, but is below such an officer in 
Rajasthan (in fact, he ranks below an officer with as little as nine years of 
service), and in Rajasthan, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland, brigadiers are ranked 
below deputy commissioners
Similar disparities in pay and pension allowances and in difficult housing 
conditions have contributed to the decline in status of the military profession 
m  India to the point where the subject has become a regular feature of the 
professional military literature Significantly, virtually no such complaints
14
are heard from the navy or air force Thus the largest service is the one in 
greatest social decline, and the two armed s^lvices that are weaxest within the 
government remain the most popular among the general educated elite of India 
This military is neither elitist nor ideological, but is officered by 
average talent Officers are increasingly the product of the military culture 
itself, many having been taught entirely m  cantonment schools, raised in the 
cantonment atmosphere, and obligated entirely to the military for their 
livelihood and enhanced status from cradle to funeral pyre But, the officer is 
not isolated from his own society The contemporary officer is keenly aware of 
the personal and institutional corruption which surrounds him, even among the 
political leadership of the state Published reports indicate that this 
corruption has touched the military directly [16] In particular, contact with 
the broader civilian society m  the area of recruitment, and in purchases of 
stores and equipment are known for their "opportunity" Young officers who want 
to make money on the side gravitate to recruiting details, where bribes of 
several thousand rupees are not uncommon
There is one important principle involved in this brush with corruption A 
man who resists temptation from this direction, who resists pressures from 
family, caste or friends to bend the rules, and who tries to uphold the highest 
professional standards will feel doubly betrayed by the politician who uses him 
and his men for corrupt goals He will also regard a threat to his service as a 
threat to himself, since he is unlikely to have any place to go after 
resignation In brief, the military becomes increasingly sensitive to lateral 
pressures from a materialistic society and to pressures from above, when the
officer corns is both professional and drawn from the lower middle class
15
Future Generations
All available evidence indicates that the young officers now in the Indian 
army —  the colonels of the year 2000, and the generals of 2010 —  are very much 
like their predecessors The conclusions of one recent study of young boys in 
higher secondary schools indicate that central (state run and somewhat less 
prestigious) school students favor the military profession at a far greater rate 
than the so-called convent schools (which are more or less private and whose 
students are somewhat more upoer class) [17] The lure of private industry has 
reduced the status of all but few government-related jobs for the average 
Indian Very few sons of commissioned officers join the army probably not 
more than 10-, according to one study, "today there is no such thing as martial 
tradition Sons who automatically joined the old man's regiment are now 
plumping for civvy street ' The incentive is gone The so-called good 
families no longer consider the armed forces as a last resort for a not very 
intelligent offspring Even he goes to a firm [18]
This lack of interest in the armed forces by the educated and upper class 
families of India is not without parallel in other countries, including Pakistan 
and the United States It is probably related to the decline in interest within 
the army in the fighting branches, which had traditionally attracted the best 
and the brightest Now there are severe shortfalls m  officer volunteers for 
the infantry and artillery while branches such as the service and ordnance corps 
are oversubscribed [19]
The change in the social composition of the army officer corps and the 
shifting interests of those who do join may not or may not indicate a dimunition 
of officer quality and the overall fighting capacity of the armed forces 
Without the test of war, such changes are hard to measure However, the senior
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levels of the armed forces are deeply concerned over these social changes, and 
have pressed the government to improve working conditions
The major conclusions to be drawn from the above discussion are that 
India's armed forces, especially the army, are increasingly regionally and 
socially representative of Indian society The gap oetween officer and jawan is 
closing rapidly, Indian officers have come to show a dramatic preference for 
branches (and services) which are civilîanized , i e where they can learn a 
useful skill in anticipation of the day when they will return to civilian 
society
Does this change in the social composition of the officer corps have 
political implications? In itself, probably not Those who fear the Indian 
Army as the last bastion of an elite upper class need not worry Nor are there 
likely to be direct political consequences of this shift in social class The 
Pakistan Army underwent a similar transformation after World War II and remains 
politically active The U S military, also saw its social composition alter 
after World War I and transformed after World War II, but remains politically 
inert As we shall discuss below, any change in the political role of the 
Indian armed forces will depend more upon actions of the civilians than the 
armed forces and probably come about through other routes Nevertheless, 
military grievances over pay and status are substantial, and may be contributing 
factor to an increased role for the armed forces
17
III The Military Experiences of the Indian Army
It is important to note the type of armed conflicts that the Indian Army 
has engaged in, since this does have some oeanng upon their oolitical role 
Figure 2 summarizes these conflicts It shows that the Indian Army has been 
almost continuously active since 1947 at every level from police action to 
preparation for nuclear war How has this shaped the views and potential 
political role of the Indian military”?
Partition Riots and Internal War
From 1947 onward the Indian armed forces (especially the army) has been 
intermittently involved in a variety of inte nal security tasks, ranging from 
the suppression of communal violence, to fairly large-scale counter-insurgency 
actions Indeed, the first "war' that the independent Indian Army engaged in was 
the bitter communal violence surrounding Partition The savagery of Muslim, 
Hindu, and Sikh came as a shock even to those officers who had seen combat in 
World War II Almost simultaneously, the Indian Army was engaged in a war with 
Pakistan and local raiders over control of Kashmir [20] These experiences 
ultimately convinced both military and civilian of the need to create a buffer 
between the army and such unpleasant tasks No army can train efficiently for 
conventional war and stand by for n o t  control not only does the latter 
disrupt training cycles and demand different kinds of tactics and doctrine, but 
conflict with Pakistan meant that the army could no longer be permanently 
quartered in and around India's major cities
Thus, in the 1950s and the 1960s, a number of important paramilitary forces 
were created [21] The attitude of the Indian Army towards these forces is 
decidedly mixed On the one hand there is universal agreement that such forces
18
are necessary to insulate the military from direct involvement with comminai, 
regional, religious, or other civil disorders On the other hand, the officers 
are jealous of these paramilitary forces The officers and men of such forces 
receive considerably better pay and serving allowances than the army itself, and 
often a status and authority which they do not deserve The military would like 
to control such forces, or be able to place their own officers and men in than 
on a temporary basis [22]
From the mid-fifties onward, the army was called upon to deal with 
recalcitrant tribal groups who were seeking autonomy or independence The army 
has been continuously deployed in Nagaland, Mizoram, and elsewhere in a 
counter-insurgency role Some of the counter-insurgency literature that it nas 
produced out of the Nagaland experience can stand with the best written on the 
subject [23]
The army has accepted close political supervision of its actions in 
Nagaland and Mizoram and understands the need for restraint The tribal 
struggles do not have the potential (as does Punjab or Kashmir) for rapid 
escalation and they serve the useful purpose of giving various units combat 
experience under controlled circumstances Yet there is a certain chaffing with 
political control It is exacerbated when the army must work with police 
officers of lesser experience, or with paramilitary forces over which it has 
limited or no control
"A Communal Riot with Armor"
The three wars between India and Pakistan have had a special quality about 
them In the words of one Indian general, they are more like 'communal riots 
with armor," than wars between sovereign states The identities of India (a
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secular state with a large Muslim minority) and Pakistan (an avowedly religious 
state) stand as a challenge to each other, and both are extremely sensitive to 
the domestic politics of the other, especially m  communal matters
There is considerable evidence that in recent years all three Indian 
services have studied strategies of pre-emption or first-strike should there be 
another war with Pakistan The U S I  of India Journal often carries articles 
discussing such strategies involving a move from defense to pre-emption [24]
For all three services the idea of a short, sharp, aggressively fought war is 
partly linked to their demands for new weapons systems (an additional aircraft 
carrier and nuclear submarines for the navy, the DPSA for the IAF, and a new 
generation of armor and more APCs for the army), but it is also rooted m  the 
never again" attitude that derives from the wars of 1962, 1965, and 1971
However, civilians (including Indira Gandhi) have been wary of this line of 
argument While not reluctant to use force, she openly criticized "the theory 
of deterrence before graduates of the National Defense College —  one of the 
main centers for the study of strategy (and deterrence) in India The concept 
of deterrence, she argued, along with theories of arms races "only weakens the 
will of the nation while not deterring opponents "[25] In this, her views were 
derived from her father, who was outspokenly critical of the superpower argument 
that their conflict was an arms race, and that their security was oest protected 
by a strong, deterrent nuclear force
Interventions Chinese, American, Soviet
India's armed forces have also had to cope with external interventions into 
South Asia by the two superpowers and China Each influenced the military's 
thinking in important ways
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The most disastrous experience was the defeat by China in 1962 This was a 
watershed m  Indian thinking about the importance of preparedness, modern 
equipment, and the need to maintain standing forces It taught the Indian 
military that a division in training is of no use against an enemy advancing 
towards your major cities, and ten divisions a year away was a cruel joke 
Similarly, modern equipment located m  the inventories of the U S  or Great 
Britain, or on the drawing boards in Krishna Menon's armaments factories (which 
were turning out high-quality espresso machines m  considerable number) could be 
translated into the death of one's close comrades and friends
The 1962 war and its aftermath also showed that the Indian Army was 
professional enough to reconstruct itself after a shattering military and moral 
defeat [26] It had the full support of the political community and some foreign 
assistance, but basically the post-1962 expansion and reform was an internal 
military achievement
Its success in this effort did not obscure two vital lessons drawn by most 
officers The first was that the performance of the officer corps itself ranged 
from mediocre to incompetent, with a very few brave (and largely posthumous) 
exceptions The second lesson (somewhat easier to accept) was that the military 
as a whole had been betrayed by the politicians, including Nehru and Krishna 
Menon The lesson was applied in 1965 when the then COAS, J N Chaudhun, 
asked for and was granted operational freedom, a situation exactly opposite that 
of 1962, when Nehru, Menon, and senior intelligence officers and civil servants 
controlled the tiniest movement of army units [27] The turning point was the 
skirmish over Kutch in Spring, 1965, which led Chaudhury to ask the Defense 
Minister (Y B Chawan) and the Prime Minister (Lai Bahadur Shastn) for 
guidance He ultimately prepared the appropriate moves" which included a
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counterattack across the international frontier m  case of a Pakistani attack in 
Kashmir itself [28] The '65 pattern was followed in modified form m  1971 
Once permission to attack was given the army was left entirely on its own in the 
east until the Pakistan Army surrendered This time the army played a greater 
role in the peacemaking process and insisted that some territories taken from 
Pakistan not be returned for tactical military reasons
Two other external interventions in South Asia must be noted The first 
was the sailing of the O S S  Enterprise and its escort vessels towards the Bay 
of Bengal m  1971 There have been rumors and published anecdotal accounts of 
preparations to resist the Enterprise should it interfere with Indian operations 
in East Bengal With a growing air-sea surveillance capability, as well as 
specific responsibilities that extend as far as the Andamans, it can be assumed 
that there are plans to resist a future naval incursion should it be 
required [29]
The second external intervention of consequence is the Russian occupation 
of Afghanistan The military regard this as an unmitigated disaster from two 
perspectives the first being that it has enaoled Pakistan to acquire new 
weapons, and the second that it has raised an entirely new set of problems for 
the military should Pakistan itself deteriorate Unlike 1971, when East 
Pakistan was virtually isolated from all important external contacts, a 
deterioration m  Pakistan’s internal stability would not mean a free ride for 
the Indian Army Now, only Pakistani military capabilities are somewhat 
greater, but there is the possibility that the Soviets will play a direct 
military role in Pakistan (by assisting some Pakistani groups or attacking 
Pakistani military installations) or an indirect military role (by trying to 
restrict Indian movement to the West through diplomacy and the cutoff of spares
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or parts) Needless to say, the advent of the Soviet Union as a presence in 
South Asia vastly complicates the Indian position, as it is both a potential 
collaborator and a rival for the role of dominant South Asian power
Nuclear War
Finally, the Indian military has at least a theoretical interest in nuclear 
war The subject was included in the army’s Staff College syllabus as early as 
the mid-fifties, but only when an Indian weapon became a distinct possibility 
(by the late sixties) did the army take the bomb seriously [30] From an army 
perspective, there is sane fear that the budget for conventional weapons would 
oe cut to supplant a nuclear weapon and its delivery systems Army officers 
have also raised the problem of control Not only are they concerned that 
another service might assume the responsibility for nuclear weapons, but this 
would further strain inter-service cooperation
The arguments m  favor of nuclear weapons are more muted The most 
powerful of these is that a nuclear weaapon would enable India to meet China on 
equal terms and g a m  permanent strategic superiority over Pakistan The 
political and strategic consequences of this view are that India would be able 
to settle the border dispute with China m  a way which satisfies Indian honor 
and security requirements, and that in any future conflict with Pakistan there 
would be no need to hold back
While one can find both advocates and critics of an Indian nuclear weapon 
in the military, most officers apparently subscribe to the "option1 strategy, 
although there has been a subtle movement towards rather than away from nuclear 
acquisition The military, after wishing that the issue would go away, have 
positioned themselves so that while they cannot be accused of pressuring the
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government to go nuclear, they will be the first to stake a claim for control 
over nuclear weapons once the decision is reached Civilian concern over army 
control over a nuclear weapon is one factor operating against a decision to go 
nuclear and to hang on to the "do-nothing ' option as long as possible
To summarize, the war experiences of the Indian armed forces have been as 
diverse as those of any other modern military They range from internal wars of 
national consolidation and counter insurgency, to war witn Pakistan and China, 
and have begun to involve planning for nuclear war Most of these conflicts 
have involved the army, but recent changes in doctrine, and additions of new, 
modern equipment, have given the air force and navy a greater role m  any future 
conflict The latter two services are especially attuned to threats from the 
sea
The Indian military has undergone a complete transformation from being an 
imperial auxiliary, lacking any significant modern weapons, to something 
approximating a balanced military force, possessing nearly all modern arms 
Yet, it retains its domestic internal security role, and in recent years has 
expanded this role to include the governance of several Indian states This 
suggests that we must carefully examine not only the institutional and social 
means by which this large and powerful military machine is controlled, but the 
increasing political role played by the military
IV The Armed Forces and the Policy Process
The Indian armed forces play a remarkably amali role in the shaping of 
security and defense-reiated policies, and virtually no role in the shaping of 
policies outside this area Indeed, probably no military of equivalent 
importance or size has less influence This situation was not inherited from the
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British, but was assembled, piece by piece, over the years, and is now enshrined 
m  various constitutional and bureaucratic structures We will examine these 
below, and then discuss vulnerable points m  Section V
Formal Structures
As India achieved independence m  1947, a number of structural and 
constitutional arrangements were instituted, which had the net effect of 
ensuring that decisive military power would remain m  the hands of the Union 
government, and that within that government the armed forces would be strictly 
subordinate to civilian political and administrative control [31]
The initial step involved removing the Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, 
from the Governor General's Executive Council, when the interim government was 
formed m  September, 1947 He was replaced by a civilian defense menber (Sardar 
Baldev Singh) A Defense Member1s committee was created, and had the 
commander-m-chief, the defense secretary, and the financial advisor as members 
After August 15, 1947, this was transformed into the Defense Minister* s 
Committee, and the heads of the air force and the navy joined it The army
C-m-C then became theoretically equal to the heads of the other, much smaller
and weaker services (In 1955 the heads of all three services were renamed as 
chiefs of their respective staffs, further reducing their status)
The Indian Constitution of 1950 further clarified the power of the union 
government and the dominance of civilian authority It makes clear that India 
is a union, not a federation of states, and that the latter have no right of 
secession This Union has exclusive power to ensure the "defense of India and 
every part thereof including preparation for defense and all such acts as may be
conducive m  times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to
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effective demobilization ' Indeed, this is the first item on the list of 
subjects exclusively reserved for the Union government
Theoretically, the 'supreme command of the defense forces of the union' is 
vested in the President of India, but the President is obligated to be 
"regulated by law," and de facto control over the government apparatus was 
vested in the Prime Minister Article 74 (1) of the Constitution states that 
"There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as head to aid 
and advise the President m  the exercise of his functions " Conventions, 
established over the years, and later constitutional changes, have ensured that 
"aid and advice' is authoritative, and no President has attempted to exercise 
independent corrmand over the armed forces
Indian defense policy has usually been formulated at the highest level by a 
subcommittee of the cabinet Originally termed the Defense Committee, then the 
Emergency Committee (after the 1962 war with China), it is now called the 
Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet The chiefs of staff of the armed 
services are not members of this committee, but may be invited to sit m  on 
meetings They are members of the Defense Minister's Committee, and have their 
own interservice committee, the Chiefs of Staff Committee This committee is 
chaired by the service chief with the longest tenure on the committee, ensuring 
that the dominant service, the army, will not automatically chair this 
committee ' Collectively, the Chiefs of Staff Committee is the highest 
professional advisor to the government on defense matters "[32] The present 
structure is summarized in Figure 3
While civilian defense officials claim that this complicated system of 
committees ensures authoritative political guidance to the military and sound 
military advice to the politicians,[33] many in the military would disagree
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They have written that because of the increase in the ministerial membership of 
the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs, the actual participation of the 
service chiefs at the highest level of decision making has become more diffuse, 
and there is a tendency not to invite the service chiefs even when defense 
matters are discussed [34] Instead, the services have been represented by the 
Defense Secretary, further weakening their access to what is, on paper, the 
final decision-making authority on defense matters
Further, the Defense Minister's Committee has been virtually replaced by 
the Committee on Defense Planning (CDP), under the chairmanship of the Cabinet 
Secretary The CDP includes the Secretary to the Prime Minister, the 
Secretaries for Defense, Defense Production, Finance, External Affairs, and the 
Secretary of the Planning Commission, as well as the chiefs The CDP thus 
reduces the direct access of the military to the political decision makers, and 
by sheer numbers, implies the dominance of civilian bureaucrats, and even a 
lessening of the role of the Minister of Defense, since the secretary of the CDP 
can report directly to the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs
Bureaucratic and Political Control
The Indian military are not only legally circumscribed, but have been 
bureaucratically and politically contained by the powerful Ministry of Defense 
and successive ministers of Defense In peacetime, the Ministry of Defense 
dominates the defense policy process It has three major functions the 
approval or ratification of service-originated proposals (and the scrutiny of 
their financial implications), all policy concerning the location and operation 
of defense industries —  including the choice of weapons that will be produced 
m  these industries —  and all public information and policy statements
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pertaining to defense and security matters The Ministry of Defense has no 
operational authority, but it also decides what is or is not a 'policy matter, 
and hence fit for ministry or cabinet level review
The civilian officials of the Defense Ministry regard themselves as the 
pivot on which the defense policy process revolved The ministry's class I 
cadre remains quite small, considering their resoonsibilities and influence 
Generally, the civilians who fill these positions have only the most rudimentary 
military or defense background Since their tenure is only five years, K 
Subrahmanyam notes that for their first two or three years they are still 
acquiring knowledge about an unfamiliar field, they are only in a position to 
contribute to policymaking during the last half of their tenure Few have had 
extensive international experience Typically, they are intensely aware of the 
internal political and social aspects of defense, not the role of defense policy 
as an instrument of foreign policy
These shortcomings of civilian officials, coupled with their enormous veto 
power over what the generals propose, greatly irritates the military One 
retired officer, now a defense writer, characterizes the civilian defense 
official as "one who can talk about and pronounce judgment upon the knottiest 
professional problem with nonprofessional competence but professional air "[35] 
For their part, senior civilian defense officials have pointed out the caution 
and timidity of the military, to the point where they are incapable of 
intelligently sustaining a war, and hence fail at their chief role to support 
diplomacy during a conflict
Over the years a variety of appointments have been made to the Defense 
portfolio, and these fall into two types The first have been politically weak 
but administratively competent individuals, who have "managed" the military and
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the Ministry of Defense With one exception, Mrs Gandhi's appointments were in 
this category This exception was Bansi Lai, who reportedly abused his 
authority and angered the miltary His friendship with Sanjay Gandhi made him 
too politically powerful for the military to oppose He exploited, harassed, 
and humiliated senior officers, and on more than one occasion used his position 
to arrange special military facilities for Sanjay Gandhi and other favored 
politicians The abuses were particularly evident during the Emergency After 
she returned to power in 1980, Mrs Gandhi reverted to her earlier pattern by 
the appointment of first R Venkataraman and then S B Chawan to the Defense 
portfolio Rajiv Gandhi's appointment of P V Narasimha Rao as his Defense 
Minister indicates that he, too, does not wish to appoint a potential political 
rival to the post, nor an administrative incompetent
Earlier, more activist Ministers had been appointed by Nehru (Krishna Menon 
and Y B Chawan) and during the Janata period (Jagjivan Ram) Menon and Ram, 
in particular, involved themselves m  recruitment, training, and promotion 
practices with mixed reactions from the armed services Some trace the present 
conflict over reductions m  Sikh recruitment back to Jagjivan Ram's concerted 
effort to broaden the army's recruitment base
The Chiefs' Controversy
The Indian military have accepted, but not enjoyed, their ever-lessenmg 
influence at the higher levels of the policy process They are faced with a 
dilemma as long as they retain active command over their respective services, 
civilian officials are reluctant to increase their influence within the central 
decision making process The Indian chiefs have enormous operational authority, 
especially during wartime, but only advisory power at the center There they
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are treated as formal equals, despite the obviously greater operational 
authority of the army COAS, and kept well away from the ultimate level of 
decision-making
Naturally, the armed services —  especially the army —  would like to 
change this arrangement, and this issue lies at the heart of the long-standing 
debate over the role of the chiefs Should there be a fourth chief, as in the 
ü S and U K 7 If so, who should it be? The sugggestion of a fourth chief goes 
back at least to 1949, and was raised again in the 1960s by General J N 
Chaudhun and more recently ( m  1982) another COAS, General Krishna Rao [36]
The army is the natural advocate of an expanded joint chiefs system along
the lines of the British Chief of Defense Staff system or the U S Joint Chiefs
In virtually every Western country (they argue) such a system exists for
coordinating military operations during wartime, and providing coordinated and
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combined advice to civilians The Indian system has been notorious for the lack 
of both During 1965 and 1971 there was very little inter-service coordination 
(m 1962 the navy and air force were not involved m  the fighting in any 
significant way) P C Lai, the then Air Marshal, claims that Chaudhun 
created the problem m  1965 by his unilateral determination of army strategy and 
failure to consult with the other two services, Lai himself determined what the 
IAF strategy targeting would be in 1971, apparently without reference to army 
wishes Other accounts indicate that the successful combined operations against 
Karachi were due more to good luck and fortunate timing than integrated military 
planning
Somewhat disingenuously, the army advocates of a CDS system claim that the 
Chief need not be from the army, but might be an air force or navy man Whoever 
it was would presumably have to leave his own service parochialism behind
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The CDS system is strongly opposed by most navy and air force officers and 
a good number of politicians and the civilian bureaucracy The navy and the IAF 
naturally feel that they would never get to hold the chairmanship Further, 
since the Indian military fights on or near its own borders, a CDS system is 
unnecessary since proper coordination could take place within the current system 
—  especially if the army would cooperate
The political arguments against the CDS system are not as openly voiced, 
but in the current situation are powerful and final First, there is the 
long-standing civilian suspicion of men in uniform, and a deep-seated belief 
(held by Nehru and, apparently, Mrs Gandhi) that the military remain a 
potential trouble spot for Indian democracy Creating a fourth chief would mean 
creating a fourth general, or even an officer of field marshal rank, without 
good cause More to the point, it runs counter to the divide and rule strategy 
employed by Nehru, Shastn, and Indira Gandhi, implemented by the civilian 
bureaucrats, and directed against the armed forces —  in particular, the 
army [37] In India, the navy and the air force present no credible political 
threat, but the army might The present arrangement reduces the army chief to 
no more than equal (and less than equal, when he does not chair the Joint Chiefs 
committee) Would changing this system actually improve the quality of military 
advice (ask those civilians who oppose change) when the military at best are not 
terribly inventive7 Reshuffling the chief's system —  they argue —  would not 
improve military decision making, but it might enhance the political power of 
the military
An additional word is m  order on the selection of the chiefs particularly 
the COAS This has two dimensions the failure of a Sikh to become chief of 
the army staff (even though the army's officer corps is about 15-18^ Sikh), and
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the apparent manipulation of appointments to ensure that the COAS would be an 
officer who was politically acceptable to the government We shall discuss the 
problem of the Sikhs when loooking at the Punjab crisis, although it should be 
noted that Sikhs have become chiefs of the Air Force Staff and Navy Staff
When considering promotions to the COAS position, the first step is the 
preparation by the Defense Ministry bureaucracy of a statement of qualifications 
and experience of the five regional commanders northern, southern, eastern, 
western and central, plus the vice chief of staff —  all lieutenant generals 
The six constitute a panel from which the COAS is selected by a cabinet 
subcommittee for appointments presided over by the Prime Minister
Until recently, the principle of seniority has been followed m  promoting 
the COAS from this group (promotions at earlier levels are made largely by the 
mulitary itself) There had earlier been great controversy when Lieut Gen 
Harbaksh Singh and Lieut Gen P S Bhagat, two outstanding officers, were 
allowed to retire because they barely lacked seniority
The first overt violation of the seniority principle came on June 1, 1975, 
barely a month before the imposition of the Emergency, when Lieut Gen T N 
Raina was made COAS, jumping over at least one other officer with greater 
seniority The second violation occurred in May, 1983, in an even more 
controversial appointment [38] One of India's most brilliant soldiers,
Lieut -Gen S K Sinha, was superseded by Lieut -Gen A S Vaidya, even though 
Sinha was Vice-Chief of the Army Staff, and thought to be in line to become the 
new chief Vaidya was thought to have seriously compromised himself with public 
criticism of the ruling CPM government in Tripura and praise for the election 
alliance between Congress (I) and another party He was attacked in the press 
by the CPM party leadership as having given "political statements", and the
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defense public relations service had to issue a statement to the effect that the 
Indian army "continues to remain apolitical m  its best tradition '[39] Sinha 
responded to his supercession by turning m  his resignation Several newspapers 
reprinted some of his perceptive writings on the problems of civil-military 
relations m  India He has since entered politics and received widespread 
support from a group of journalists and retired officers who regard him as one 
of the best officers ever produced by the Indian Army [40]
These two incidents occurred under Mrs Gandhi, and it is widely believed 
that she was responsible for the supercessions Her defenders argued that the 
principle of seniority was not inviolable, although they had earlier used it to 
justify the retirement of otherwise very well qualified generals These 
episodes fit into the broader pattern of her style of governance, in which 
appointments were made —  and unmade —  as a matter of convenience and later 
justified The practice disturbed the military, and tended to encourage senior 
officers to curry favors from the political leadership, further dividing them 
The generals could accept a system in which promotion was based on a principle 
of merit, or one based upon strict seniority, but a system m  which promotions 
are made in order to keep the military divided is likely to have exactly the 
opposite effect in the long run
While the military's formal role in the higher decision-making system has 
probably declined over the years, there has been a considerable expansion of 
military influence at other levels Under Mrs Gandhi, retired senior officers 
were appointed as governors, headed various defense production and research 
facilities, and served on various public commissions and agencies In some 
cases active duty officers have received non-military appointments to such 
bodies The newest (1984) Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal M L
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Khatre, had been head of the giant manufacturing and research complex, Hindustan 
Aeronautics, Ltd Quite often, senior officers are immediately appointed to 
such choice positions immediately upon retirement (Gen K V Krishna Rao was 
made Governor of the militarily sensitive states of Manipur, Nagaland and 
Tripura in June, 1984)
There is considerable indirect evidence to show that these 
government-controlled appointments are not given to recalcitrant officers, but 
to those who have cooperated with the government during their tenure m  the 
military As the social status of the armed forces continues to decline, it 
will be easier for the government to use post-service employment as a reward to 
pliable officers, especially if these officers have no other career or income to 
fall back on
As in the case of manipulation of promotion to the seniormost positions m  
the armed services, this strategy may be effective in the short run, but it 
further embitters those officers who have not "cooperated", and who feel that 
their colleagues have sold out the profession for personal advancement Indeed, 
for every officer that receives an ambassadorship, or the directorship of a 
defense laboratory or production facility, there must be two or three equally 
well qualified who do not, and who may ]Oin the pool of the embittered and
resentful
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V Civil-Military Relations Subordination or Equality*?
In a reasonably well developed political system, such as India's, with a 
long tradition of civilian dominance over the military, any change in the 
relationship between the two will be incremental, not dramatic Despite this, 
there is a long tradition of alarmist writing about the imminent take-over of 
the military m  India This has been a popular subject for journalists who have 
been predicting the increased intervention of the army for years [41]
Scholarly analyses have usually been more restrained Their picture of a 
large, diverse, sprawling military establïushment, divided into three services,
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numerous commands within each service, all directed by political and 
bureaucratic elites fully aware of the need to maintain civilian authority, 
legitimacy, and control is essentially accurate [42] Interestingly, even the 
journalists have begun to subscribe to this view, and predictions of military 
take-over have been replaced by relatively balanced analysis The Indian Army 
is now held up as an exception to the dismal parade of coup and 
counter-coup [43]
Although I am one of those who have made a strong case for regarding India 
as an exception to the widespread pattern of military intervention, optimism 
about the political role of the Indian military is premature, and a number of 
the barriers to military intervention have been removed or weakened Others 
remain, but the circumstances under which they, too, will vanish are not 
difficult to imagine In brief, it is necessary to reconsider the assumptions 
upon which the conclusions of non-intervention are based
Military intervention in politics will always be a function of the size and 
complexity of the political system (the more complex, the harder it will be for
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the military to govern it), and the size and complexity of the military (the 
more complex, in seme ways the easier it is to steer from the center, and the 
greater its institutional stake in the overall system), and the prevalent form 
of civilian control (whether the military are ruled because they are different 
than civilians or just like them) Armies the size and complexity of India's do 
not intervene lightly, but because of overwhelming pressures and political 
compulsions Above all they will intervene to protect their own institutional 
integrity or to protect a political order which in turn shields them or which 
they value as citizens
The Indian Army is a long way from overt intervention but there have been 
many signals that some of the barriers to intervention —  or increased military 
influence —  have disappeared The most important such barrier —  the 
legitimacy, integrity, and competence of the central political system —  has 
badly eroded in the past fourteen years This erosion includes the decline of 
the Congress party (except as a vehicle for Indira Gandhi's personal rule) and 
the simultaneous failure of opposition parties to demonstrate their ability to 
govern effectively, fairly, and without serious corruption For the 
professional soldier there was not much choice between the capricious Janata 
government and the willful combination of Bansi Lai and Sanjay Gandhi Service 
resentment over political incompetence —  especially when that incompetence 
affects the conduct of war or the readiness of the military to fight a war, runs 
deep [44] Some day it may be the force which propels the military into 
politics Nor are the armed forces, especially the army, passive observers of
the deterioration and increasing violence and lawlessness of Indian politics 
They have begun to play a direct role m  the political systen through the rear 
entrance called "aid to the civil power "
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From Aid to the Civil to Military-Civilian Partnership?
One of the central myths of the Indian political system is that the Indian 
military is "apolitical " This is true only insofar as the armed forces do not 
rule India, and the decision-making process is dominated by civilians It is 
also true that the folklore of the mess says that politics and the military 
profession do not mix, and that young officers are taught that the Indian 
military must remain apolitical However, it is not true in the sense that the 
military know nothing about politics, or that they do not act m  support of 
political objectives, or that they do not themselves directly govern more and 
more of India
Most officers, especially army commanders, are very well informed about 
domestic politics, let alone broader strategic and foreign policy issues Every 
part of India is in an area command, and many cities are part of or adjacent to 
cantonments or bases In each of these cases the area commander has, as part of 
his professional duties, a complete knowledge of local politics He wíl be able 
to recite with precision the factions, interests, and objectives of each local 
political, religious, or other interest group In this he is supported by the 
military's own intelligence services and close liaison with police and civilian 
bureaucracies
This knowledge is important should the military be called upon 'in aid of 
the civil power " After independence it was recognized that "aid to the civil" 
could be damaging to the preparedness of the armed forces The example of 
Pakistan (where the army ultimately intervened in central politics after having 
been repeatedly called out to prop up civilian authority) was also noted These 
two considerations led to the creation of a massive structure of paramilitary
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forces, which were to serve as a buffer between the regular armed forces and the 
rough and tumble of domestic disorder
Despite these paramilitary forces —  and in a few cases because of them —  
the direct intervention of the armed forces in state and local matters has 
steadily increased in the past few years Most of these interventions have been 
limited, and were quick "in and out" operations In this sense, the military 
have acted in support of the political structure, providing ultimate force m  
situations where political solutions had failed and where the police could not 
cope
The increase in such interventions has been dramatic During 1951-70 the 
army was called in to suppress domestic violence on approximately 476 
occasions [45] By contrast, the figures for the eighteen month period, June 
1979-December, 1980 saw sixty-four instances of army assistance to civil 
authorities Table 1 lists these by state and purpose, although the category 
"other" suggests official censorship, perhaps to conceal disturbances in the 
paramilitary and other security forces themselves Some of these are listed in 
Table 2 A list of typical army interventions is presented in Table 3
These data suggest that the paramilitary security forces within India are 
themselves a security problem for the army the literature on the subject 
indicates deep army concern about the failings of these forces, beginning in 
1973, when the Uttar Pradesh Armed Constabulary took up arms against the 
government in a labor dispute This concern is justified, since the number of 
and size of these paramilitary forces is increasing faster than their 
reliability and efficiency
The army's support of political authority in these aid to the civil 
operations has led into actual military rule in more than one state The legal
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basis for enhanced army responsibility varies, but a number of ordinances, 
promulgated under the President's emergency powers, are now in place
—  the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1956, subsequently amended) whereby the 
union government declares a state or district a "disturbed area In areas 
where the declaration comes into force, army and paramilitary commanders are 
given authority to arrest suspects, conduct searches, and use lethal force 
without regard to the authority of the District Magistrate (who ordinarily 
supervises aid to the civil operations)
—  the National Security Act (1980) authorizes security forces to arrest and 
detain suspects for up to six months without a warrant Although there are 
provisions for judicial review, the intent of the legislation is to give the 
armed forces a relatively free hand m  dealing with agitators, terrorists, and 
rioters Many provisions of this act are identical to those of the Maintenance 
of Internal Security Act (MISA) which was the legal basis for the Emergency of 
1975-77
—  the Essential Services Maintenance Act allows army troops to replace striking 
workers in "vital" industries such as oil production and rail transport The 
industries are effectively taken over by the army pending settlement of the 
dispute Strikers can be subject to arrest under provisions of the National 
Security Act
—  the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (1967) allows the center to ban 
subversive organizations This currently applies to rebellious Sikh 
organizations in the Punjab and several insurgent groups m  the northeast
—  the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance (1984) was designed 
to help the army root out Sikh terrorists m  the Punjab [46] This provides for 
secret tribunals to try terrorists and is based upon the presumption of guilt —
TABLE 1
Army Deployments m  Support Of Civil Authorities 
June 1979 -December 1980
Reason for Deployment
State Law Sc Order Maintenance of Disaster OtherEssential Services Relief
during Strikes
Bihar 6 1 1 4
Gujarat 4 — 4 1
Punjab 2 2 — 5
Karnataka - - 3 1
Delhi 2 2 - 5
Haryana - - 2 1
Kerala 3 — —
Orissa 3 — 1 —
Madhya
Pradesh 3 — 2 3
Tamil Nadu 2 - 1 —
Andamans &
Nicobar 2 - — —
Meghalaya 4 1 1 1
Assam 2 — 5 “*
West Bengal - - 1 12
Manipur 2 — 1
Nagaland 2 — 11
Tripura 1 -
Uttar
Pradesh 17 - 2 27
Jammu &
Kashmir 7 - — 40
Arunachal
Pradesh 1 - — 1
Mizoram 1 - 2 25
Himachal
Pradesh - 1 1 14
Maharashtra - - 14 2
Andra
Pradesh - - 2 1
Rajasthan - — 3 3
Sikkim 3
TOTAL 64 7 46 159
*This category includes inter alia, mine detecting, bomb 
disposal, vehicle recovery, and road and bridge maintenance
Source Lt Colonel M M L Ahuja, In Service of the People, 
Sainik Samachar, Jan 17,1981, p 46
Table 2, Disturbances Within Peacekeeping Forces
Since 1978
Year Location Cause of Unrest Outcome
1978 Tamil Nadu CRPF strike state 
police unwilling to 
move against strikers!
2 batt BSF 
end strike
1979 Gujarat police strike army restores 
order 5,000 
arrested,firing
1979 Bhubaneswar,Puri,Trivandrum, CRPF, CISF, RPF strikes 
Cuttack, Neemuch, Thurnba, Cochin 
Madras, Pt Blair,Delhi,Bokaro
Army & BSF disarm 
strikers 24 CISF & 
3 army jawans 
killed at Bokaro 
3 CRPF mutineers 
killed in Delhi
1979 Tamil Nadu police strike BSF CRPF arrest 
3,000 police
1979 Bombay abortive police strike BSF,CRPF quell 
Cong supported 
strike
1980 various Bihar,W B 
industrial locations
CISF strike,clash with 
police
army disarms CISF
1981 Gujarat police ineffective 
during caste reserv 
protests
aimy restores order
1982 Bombay police strike army restores peace
1984 Army barracks in Bihar, 
Maharashtra,Tripura, 
Rajasthan, elsewhere9
uncoordinated mutiny 
by 1,500 Sikh jawans 
in aftermath of 
Army actions i 
Golden Temple
loyal army units 
caputine mutineers, 
some flee to 
Pakistan9 Under 
trial for mutiny9
Source newspaper reports, Ministry of Defense Annual Reports
Table 3 Army Deployments, Aid to the Civil Power
iear Location Cause Duration
1973 Assam language riots 1 month
Lucknow, U P police unrest 3 weeks
Arunachal P tribal violence 1 week
Imphal, Manipur riots 1 week
Nasik, Mah electoral violence 2 days
1974 Baroda, Guj communal violence 1 week
Ahmedabad, Guj food riots 3 weeks
Dhanbad, Ranchi, Bihar communal disorder 2 weeks
Patna, Bihar student riots 1 week
all India national rail strike 3 weeks
W Bengal, 4 districts riots 2 weeks
1975 all Indian port cities docker's strike 1 week9
Delhi communal riots 1 week9
Cooch Behar, W B rural unrest 1 week
1976 State of National Emergency 
out m  aid-to-the-civil
declarea, army not called
1977-■79 no army utilization mentioned during Janata years 
Ministry of Defense Annual Reports except for 
aid-to-the-civil in cases of natural disaster
m
1980 Assam anti-foreigner stir 
& election violence
continuous
Tripura* tribal violence 6 mos
Meghalaya* tribal insurgency continuous
Manipur* student/tribal unrest 1 month
Nagaland* tribal violence continuous
U P  ,M P ,Gujarat, 
Delhi, & elsewhere9
communal violence 2 months
Bihar CISF strike 1 week9
1981 Assam anti-foreigner 1 year
Gujerat anti-reservation stir 3 months
1982 Assam anti-foreigner 1 year
Arunachal P student/tribal unrest 4 weeks
Goa communal disturbances 5 days
Baroda, Gujarat communal disturbances 2 weeks
Kerala communal disturbances 4 days
Maharashtra Bombay police strike 1 month
Mizoram,Nagaland* election violence 4 days9
Table 3 Army Deployments, p 2
Year Location Cause Duration
1983
1984
1985
No known army deployments other than continuous 
counter-insurgency operations m  northeastern states 
and peacekeeping duties in Assam Army on alert 
in several states (Punjab, Haryana)
Maharashtra (Bombay & 
nearby suburbs) 
Punjab, Chandigarh & 
nearby areas
Hyderabad, A P
New Delhi and many 
other cities
communal riots 4 weeks
Sikh terrorist 
campaign army
mutinies ongoing from
5 June
communal riots, 4 days’
political disorder
riots in wake of 
Mrs Gandhi assassi­
nation 1 week’
no new deployments ordered continuing 
security deployments for domestic 
unrest in northeastern states, Assam, 
Punjab, and perhaps selected districts 
m  Haryana and J & K
The Indian Army has been on continuous alert status 
and active m  counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist 
activities m  these states for several years
Source newspaper reports and Ministry of Defense Annual Reports
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the accused must prove himself or herself innocent It also confers special 
powers upon the security forces
This stunning array of legislation and ordinance has given the military and 
paramilitary forces ultimate power in many affected areas of Assam, Punjab, 
Kashmir and other states For millions of Indians the effective government is 
the local area or sub-area commander, the system may be less protective of civil 
liberties than even the present martial law system in Pakistan, where civil 
courts and religious courts function parallel to the martial law system and 
appeals from decisions by the latter have been frequent and successful As an 
informed Pakistani military writer has noted of the situation of the Indian army 
in Assam "Such a state of affairs is certainly not martial law but it may well 
contain all its normal concomitants, such as a suspension of civil liberties, 
imposition of press censorship, search and arrest without warrants and 
enforcement of curfew order in sensitive and badly affected areas " By itself, 
such involvement may be necessary and desirable, but the same commentator notes 
that "the military's repeated deployment in situations of extreme civil disorder 
could, on the one hand, induce the civil authority to lean more and more upon 
it, and, on the other, give the military establishment the sugary foretaste of 
power,' as it did in both Pakistan and Bangladesh [47]
This is an accurate observation The Indian military, especially the army, 
is so deeply enmeshed m  policy, commercial, and other local industrial problems 
in various parts of India that it cannot help but be contaminated by the 
contact This does not mean that its fighting qualities will lessen, but it 
will led to the growth of a corporate interest in such activities, largely for 
the material rewards they produce
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Civilian Control From "Objective" to "Subjective ?
Samuel Huntington suggests that civilian control over the military 
ultimately takes one of two forms 'Objective' control is exercised by a 
legitimate civilian elite which respects, and encourages, the differences 
between it and the military professionals The latter are devoted to their 
profession and maintain a conservative, restricted ethic By contrast, 
"subjective" control is brought about through the merger of civilian and 
military values the armed forces are controlled because they share dominant 
civilian values and their distinctiveness is blurred
India has been undergoing a transition from objective to subjective control 
for a number of years At first, the difference between civilian and political 
elites was very extreme, and there were important social and class differences 
between the two However, the military are now recruited from the same social 
classes as the political and administrative leadership, and are in some ways 
more representative of the country Increasingly, the military are called upon 
to permanently take over tasks, such as aid to the civil power and the 
maintenance of civilian services that they would have rejected thirty years ago 
Further, they are also called upon to voice the values and attitudes which are 
held by politicians —  they are asked to become "committed" in the same way that 
the civil service has asked to identify itself with the values and aspirations 
of Mrs Gandhi and the Congress Party [48]
At the same time, some politicians, most notably Mrs Gandhi, have 
encouraged military-like values and attitudes, a form of civilian militarism 
Unlike her father, Mrs Gandhi cultivated the legend of Subhas Chandra Bose and 
the secular, neo-totalitanan, egalitarian, militarism of the Indian National
Army
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Although the comparison may not be exact, some of Mrs 
Gandhi's appeal would seem to be due to the similarities 
rather than the differences between herself and Bose 
She is certainly a secularist and professes faith in 
democracy, although perhaps democracy of a special 
variety Her speeches are dominated by references to the 
need for discipline and order there is no doubt that 
she believes that internal and external enemies require 
continual vigilance, militancy, and preparedness In the 
face of such enemies, even the enemy poverty, civil 
liberties are expendable [49]
This appeal proved to be very popular, and it wíl be important to see 
whether any other national politician attempts to exploit the theme of 
militancy and militarism It certainly does find resonance m  certain 
regions of India, especially those with strong, local, martial traditions 
Similarly, it wíl be important to see whether the military are again 
called upon to make statements in support of specific political parties 
It only takes a few such statements to have a great impact upon the entire 
military establishment and the political community, for if the military 
give the impression that they have even implicity thrown their support to 
one or another political leader, they will be rapidly cultivated by all 
politicians
Several astute observers have addressed this development Romesh 
Thapar has observed that India's new breed of officer, drawn from the
42
middle classes of the Subcontinent, will invariably cane to reflect the 
varied emotions of that Subcontinent, "making politics very much a part of 
the culture of the Indian military establishment, even though the same 
distance still continues to be maintained between it and the 
politicians "[50]
This politicization is intensified by the involvement of politicians 
m  military matters, particularly m  weapons purchases There is also 
military concern over pay scales, promotion opportunities, status, and the 
difficulties of maintaining a normal family life —  especially lmoortant 
for an army whose peacetime deployment structure must be along some of the 
most rugged terrain m  the world Finally, there is a great increase in 
the number of officers due to retire, and they all face great uncertainty 
m  securing post-service employment of suitable status and compensation
Thapar places the blame for this situation on the political community, 
"which thinks only of itself and ignores the problems of the country This 
is politicization with a vengeance, because the story from the world 
outside trickles back to the carefully controlled cantonments Today it is 
well understood that anyone in uniform can find himself m  that 
soul-destroying civilian fix, despite his many years of training and 
capability-building "
He offers several remedies, including the revision of the nigher 
defense decision-making process, and clipping the power of the 
"ill-informed IAS network " He argues for a renewed trust and 
reprofessionalisn of the Indian Army on the part of the 
political-bureaucratic hierarchy "Without both, India will find itself 
with a million-man army that has lost its professionalism, that reflects
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the worst qualities of Indian life, and that has important parochial 
service interests to protect "
A number of senior officers have written along these lines for several 
years, and the military literature is replete with nostalgia for an era 
when the army kept to its narrow professional concerns But the 
involvement of the military m  important "social" (1 e , often political) 
tasks, their entanglement in strike breaking, the maintenance of essential 
services, and in an extended police role, have not exactly been resisted by 
army conrananders No senior officer has resigned his conmission (as far as 
I know) on the grounds that the armed forces were being called on to 
undertake inappropriate tasks They have, perhaps, decided to bend under 
pressure As one of India's most literate retired officers has written,
Let's face it, whether the civil servant or the soldier 
likes it or not, the political system and its ideologies 
have now become part and parcel of his daily living and 
the environment in which he works Wrongly or rightly, 
they have been allowed to permeate into almost all facets 
of his professional and cultural life, and he can no 
longer pretend to remain outside this system and yet be 
effective as he has managed to do so m  the past [The 
services] will have to learn to live with the particular 
ideology and be "committed" to it without appearing to be 
political
Brigadier Grant, who has m  the past, advocated an apolitical and neutral 
officer corps sadly concedes that "sympathizers" will do better than
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"neutrals "[51]
If tne trend is to continue, then there is reason to be concerned 
about the future professional integrity of the Indian armed forces, 
especially the army There is already a functional differentiation between 
officers who pursue strictly professional goals and those who take 
advantage of the increasing opportunities for corruption Those who seek 
money and corruption can find it —  particularly in the recruiting 
commands, in the service and supply corps, m  the neo-martial law slots m  
the Punjab and elsewhere, and in any position which brings the officer into 
contact with civilian contractors and manufacturers As m  Pakistan, part 
of the Indian Army may become entangled in a corrupting civilian society 
and part will remain true to its professional ethic
However, increasing corruption within the armed forces is not likely 
to lessen the chances of a future military intervention The example of 
Pakistan[52] indicates that corruption and civilian meddling in internal 
military promotions and policies can be a contributing factor in the 
decision to intervene Indeed, the young Pakistani officer is taught, as 
is his Indian counterpart, that intervention is undesirable, and that the 
military cannot effectively run the country without ruining itself, that 
their country is too large and too complex to be run from the center, and 
that military rule runs against the historic traditions of the armed 
forces All this turns out to be irrelevant when the military face a 
situation of domestic political breakdown which ultimately (and sometimes, 
quite rapidly) affects the integrity of the military For, above all, 
soldiers in both countries are taught that while they are the first line of 
defense against external enemies, they are also the last barrier to
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internal disarray When the politicians, the bureaucrats, and the 
paramilitary have crumbled, only the armed forces stand between national 
integrity and national dissolution Therefore, they tend to regard any 
incident which affects their own internal integrity as of transcendental 
importance Pakistan underwent such an experience as a consequence of 
several ill-fated aid to the civil power operations in Bengal and Punjab m  
the 1950s These convinced the military not only of their own supreme 
importance but of the threat to their integrity from civilian incompetence 
We now turn to the tragic, but comparable events in the Punjab m  1984, 
which may turn out to be equal in their importance
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VI The Punjab Crisis and the Army
No single event in modern Indian history has so affected the armed 
forces as the Punjab crisis of 1983-4 While the 1962 loss to China was 
humiliating, and revealed serious internal military problems, it led to a 
purge of incompetents and a major rebuilding effort The army was stronger 
after the war than before it The events of 1984 are quite different The 
integrity of the armed forces has been seriously shaken at every level, and 
affects all three services, the Punjab crisis has altered the strategic 
assumptions upon which the armed forces have based their war plans, if it 
worsens, it could lead to the disintegration of the Indian armed forces
Others will deal with the origins of the Punjab crisis and be in a 
better position to discuss solutions to what Rajiv Gandhi has publicly 
identified as the greatest threat to India's democracy We will only 
sketch out the connections between the crisis and the Indian armed forces, 
and note certain strategic implications Indeed, the latter are what 
distinguishes the Punjab crisis from those regional crises elsewhere m  
India
Sikhs and the Indian Military
Sikhs have been a major component of the Indian Army for over 130 
years, or about five generations They constituted about 25% of the Indian 
Army during World War II, and have always been regarded as among the most 
effective of the army's classes In the army they comprise two separate 
regiments One is the Sikh Regiment, largely make up of Jats, the other is 
the Sikh Light Infantry, made up of Mazbhis and Ramdasias —  scheduled
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castes One of Mrs Gandhi's assassins, Beant Singh, was reportedly a 
Mazbhi Sikh who had been discharged from the army [53] Sikhs are also 
found in several other infantry regiments which recruit on a mixed basis 
They are present m  large numbers m  the Army Service Corps, the engineers, 
artillery, armor, and other specialized branches They are also found in 
large numbers in the Air Force (perhaps a quarter of the IAF pilots are 
Sikhs), and there are substantial numbers in the Indian Navy [54]
After independence it was decided to freeze the number of "pure" one 
class regiments in the Indian Army, but this did not substantially limit 
Sikh enrollment, which may have been about 20% of the other ranks, and 
oerhaps a somewhat greater number of officers However, because of a 
policy established m  1953, and further modified m  1963 by the Military 
Affairs committee of the cabinet (which stated that no state would have a 
dominant position in recruitment), a concerted effort was made to make the 
army more representative and to recruit from those states which had not 
traditionally provided many soldiers (Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Gujerat, Andhra 
Pradesh, among others) [55] In 1974 the Punjab was still providing over 
15-6 of the army, it was assigned a quota commensurate with its population 
size of 2 6% of all of India The figure includes Hindus, however
The recruitment issue was taken up by Sikh politicians, and comprised 
one of the demands of the Akali Dal's Anandpur Sahib Resolution m  1973 The 
current President of India, Giani Zail Singh, was then Chief Minister of 
Punjab (1972-77) and took up the issue of Sikh recruitment with Mrs Gandhi 
(then Prime Minister) and the Union Defense Minister (Jagjivan Ram) The 
Akalis and other Sikh politicians demanded that fitness and merit be the 
sole criteria for recruitment to the armed forces, retired Sikh officers
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have complained that in order to exclude Sikhs, recruiting officers follow 
a discriminatory policy towards qualified Sikh candidates
By 1981 the Punjab was still sending four times its population 
percentage to the army, which led the then army chief, 0 P Malhotra, to 
remark that "I don't think that people of these states [referring to Punjab 
and Harayana, another traditional recruiting ground] have any reason to be 
dissatisfied "[56] By this time the overall percentage of "traditional", 
i e previously recruited classes, had dropped to 40-s, and "all classes" 
comprised 60% of the army The actual figures are not available [57] It 
is not clear where Gurkhas are counted, although their numbers —  even 
though they are not Indian citizens —  have increased since the new policy 
went into effect
Other regions of India have had exactly the same kind of controversy 
over 'reservations" The Sikhs, like high caste Hindus, resent the effort 
to increase scheduled caste and backward caste representation m  government 
services However, they differ from these groups m  two ways 
discontented and angry Sikhs have the skills and resources to effectively 
resist government policy with violence, and they have a religious sanction 
for their claim to a major role in the armed forces
The issue of derecruitment is very important for practical and 
ideological reasons In terms of simple employment opportunities the Sikhs 
have always regarded the armed forces as prestigious and profitable There 
must be well over 300,000 retired Sikh soldiers living m  the Punjab, most 
of whom would like to place at least one male relative in the army, navy, 
or air force They fear that this door will be shut
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What is especially galling is that Sikhs regard the newly recruited 
classes as inferior As an old Sikh recruiting handbook stated, all Sikh 
traditions are ultimately martial traditions, and the Sikh community is 
reluctant to yield their special claim to ‘martial" status [58] They find 
the norms of a secular democracy, where all groups are now regarded as 
"martial,"[59] to be naive and misguided, especially when the vital 
interests of the state are involved Sikh proponents of Khalistan are 
persuaded that they could survive as an independent country because of the 
martial qualities of the Sikh "nation "
Resentment and Mutiny
There is a long history of resentment among Sikhs m  the armed forces 
—  especially the army No Sikh has ever become chief of the army staff, 
despite the great over-representation of Sikhs in the senior ranks of the 
army In 1962 six of the Indian Army's lieutenant-generals were Sikhs (two 
of them were to die in an air crash in 1963) Out of 28 major-generals 
thirteen were Sikhs, and of seventy-nine brigadiers, there were thirty 
Sikhs [60] Sikhs failed to reach the position of COAS in 1969 and 1974 
when non-Sikh generals received extensions m  their term of service There 
is a belief that other groups within the officer corps do not treat Sikh 
officers with proper respect For the most part, however, Sikh soldiers 
have had a brilliant reputation and had no incentive or inclination to 
support terrorist, separatist, or other extreme dissident Sikh groups 
Indeed, they had been deeply involved in the many anti-terrorist and 
counter-insurgency operations undertaken by the Indian Army, especially in 
the northeast Sikh generals, officers, and jawans have been prominent in
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Nagaland, Assam, and elsewhere, and some Sikh regiments, especially the 
Sikh LI, had acquired a reputation for ferocity
Ironically, it may well have been the anti-terrorist efforts intended 
to cope with disturbances at the Asian Games that precipitated active 
dissent among retired Sikh officers Many of tnem were harassed en route 
to the games in New Delhi and several then proceeded directly to the 
Punjab, offering their services to the Akali agitation Major-General 
Jaswant Singh Bhullar has been quoted as on this episode
We had gone to Delhi and I found that m  spite of the fact
that we showed them my identity card, we were taken out of the 
bus at about nine places in Harayana I told them I was a 
retired Army officer but they did not listen and were very 
rude and abusive I felt very humiliated I have taken part 
in practically every war and been wounded twice It was very 
upsetting to think that I had to prove my patriotism in this 
country and to think I needed a passport or some document in
order to be able to go to Delhi [61]
Worse was to come
Several thousand Sikh ex-servicemen met in a convention at Amritsar on 
January 23, 1983 Among them were five retired major generals and other 
retired officer of general rank sent their messages of support The 
convention provided the leadership for a Volunteer force which the Akalis 
began to organize in March-April, 1983 Several senior retired officers 
joined Jarnail Singh Bhmdranwale and helped train his followers [62] One, 
Major-Gen Shubeg Singh, had earlier organized the Mukhti Bahini and was a
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recognized expert in insurgency warfare He later was accused and 
acquitted, of tneft [63] Jaswant Singh Bhullar, was active in the Punjab 
agitation and later came to the United States as an officer of the World 
Sikh Organization and an advocate of Khalistan [64]
By the time Operation Bluestar was launched, most Sikh units had been 
moved out of the Punjab They were not informed in advance of the attack 
on the Golden Temple and several thousand Sikhs, in a variety of training 
and active field units mutinied While the government attempted to 
minimize the seriousness of the mutinies, it is known that they included 
units guarding Santa Cruz airport in Bombay, and combat units in Rajasthan 
Jawans and officers fran these units may have fled to Pakistan These 
mutinies could not have been surprising, since there is not that much 
difference between the known and public grievances of retired Sikh soldiers 
and the concerns of Sikhs in the armed forces Indeed, given the gravity 
of the occupation of the Golden Temple, the government may have expected 
more units to mutiny Unconfirmed rumors are now circulating that most 
Sikh units are being kept well away from the Punjab and even that Sikh 
pilots are being taken from certain key air force squadrons
Many Indians were surprised at the Sikh mutiny, but should not have 
been All Indian Army regiments bind their members with a religious as 
well as a civil oath, a practice which the British merely carried over from 
earlier Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim armies Sikh soldiers are accompanied into 
battle by unit priests and the Granth Sahib The desecration of their 
religion signalled a call to arms because of their oath, not in 
contradiction to it Thus, a new controversv has arisen between those who 
have argued for clemency for the mutineers on religious grounds, and those
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who would have than punished on civil grounds [65] The dilemma facing the 
Indian government is analogous to that faced by the British when they began 
to try Indian National Army officers in 1946 At that time nationalism won 
out over military discipline, this time the chappal may be on the other 
foot
The situation m  the Punjab remains grave from both the Sikh 
perspective and the army's Sikhs, including at least 300,000 retired 
service personnel and their families, are now subject to even harsher laws 
and regulations than those enforced in Nagaland, Mizoram, and elsewhere 
They know exactly what the army patrols think of them and their Sikh 
co-religionists, for they only recently faced sullen and armed tribesmen in 
the northeast [66] The entire Sikh community has undergone a revolutionary 
alteration in their self-image, from a "we" which included Hindus, m  
opposition to Pakistan, to a "we" which excludes Hindus and has 
rediscovered the many common elements between Sikhism and Islam [67] This 
is truly the stuff out of which new nations are made, and the Khalistan 
movement is now receiving very wide support from Sikhs within India as well 
as outside it This is support offered by default Conversations with 
retired Sikh officers indicate a realistic appraisal of the weaknesses 
inherent in "Khalistan," but a fatalistic willingness to support the cause 
m  the absence of what they regard as fair terms from the government of 
India [68]
As for the Indian Army, their occupation of the Punjab is 
unprecedented and dangerous There is no conceivable military solution to 
the Punjab situation Yet, the army is called upon to supervise the most 
intimate and detailed aspects of life in the state This will further
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embitter the Sikh population in the Punjab, and cause the army to regard 
all Sikhs —  including those in the armed forces —  as potential 
terrorists No "aid to the civil power" doctrine can provide effective 
guidelines for such a situation
Strategic Considerations
To make matters worse, the Punjab is strategically vital to the armed 
forces The Punjab frontier is the most likely battleground should a new 
war break out with Pakistan It is ideal tank country, and there are 
important strategic targets (primarily on the Pakistani side) which demand 
not only complete control over Indian Punjab but the active cooperation of 
its population In 1965 and 1971 that cooperation was freely and 
generously offered by Sikh farmers, transport owners, and merchants Now, 
the situation is more akin to German-occupied France and the Indian Army 
simply cannot trust the local population should a new conflict break out
Further, the major road and rail routes to Kashmir run through Punjab, 
and a prolonged crisis in Kashmir would find the army at a severe 
disadvantage The army and the various paramilitary units in the Punjab 
cannot now prevent numerous acts of sabotage, despite an extended curfew 
In the event of a crisis with Pakistan or m  Kashmir, such sabotage would 
severely hamper the movement of troops, supplies and food
Finally, the Punjab crisis has had one unprecedented impact upon the 
Indian armed forces Given the evidence of the mutinies that occurred in 
June, 1984, the continued alienation of retired Sikh officers, and the 
close links between Sikhs in the military and those out of it it is 
reasonable to assume that no Sikh unit can be fully trusted, especially in
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a situation which involved in the Punjab itself The government has been 
forced to unprecedented statements about the attempts to spread 
disaffection in the ranks of the armed forces" —  the situation may be much 
worse [69] This probably means that the overall integrity of the Indian 
armed forces, especially the army, is badly weakened If Sikhs comprise 
about 12% of the army, then the effective fighting strength of the army is 
probably reduced by at least that figure (more, if non-Sikh units must be 
deployed so as to contain another mutiny)
This decline m  the efficiency and reliability of the Indian armed 
forces is probably greater than the increase in the capabilities of 
Pakistan's armed forces since 1982, the two combined do not add up to a 
shift m  the strategic balance between India and Pakistan, but it must 
reduce Indian dominance to mere superiority This poses no immediate 
threat to India since the present Pakistani leadership is not likely to 
engage m  any strategic adventurism, but a further decline in relative 
Indian capabilities would create new temptations and new problems A 
different Pakistani leadership might meddle m  Kashmiri or Punjabi 
politics, safe in the knowledge that India had lost its capacity for 
escalation dominance, conversely, an insecure India might turn to nuclear 
weapons to make up for its relative decline in conventional capabilities, 
finally, a worsening of the Punjab crisis could lead to open guerilla 
warfare in that state, widespread sabotage, and the breakdown in the 
integrity of the Indian armed forces if their critical Sikh component
should be removed
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VII Conclusion
This chapter began by noting the wide range of interaction between the 
Indian military and Indian society and politics The armed forces are 
under strict constitutional constraints and play a very limited role in the 
central decision making process, although they have somewhat more 
operational authority than many of their foreign counterparts Because of 
India's insecure regional environment, they must devote a great deal of 
tune to preparation and planning for war (this would seem obvious, but most 
armies in Latin America and Africa will never have to fight) The Indian 
armed forces are sending more and more trained individuals into civilian 
society every year, and their role m  the vast military production industry 
is also growing The domestic law-and-order role of the army has 
dramatically increased in recent years, and there is also a new trend for 
civilian politicians to praise some of the military virtues while asking 
the armed forces to commit themselves to specific social and ideological 
goals
None of this adds up to a dramatic change in the historically limited 
political role of the Indian armed forces There will be no coup in India, 
there is no chance of a "colonels" or "brigadiers" conspiracy to seize 
power, although there are many angry and bitter officers, especially among 
the Sikhs There may be further terrorism, but the structure of the Indian 
civil-military system is fundamentally sound, and —  for most Indians —  
the legitimacy of the political system remains high Our frequent 
allusions to Pakistan have indicated that under certain circumstances a 
professional army committed to democratic politics can intervene to reform
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the system, and many Indian observers are properly concerned that India 
might now be where Pakistan was m  the mid-50s [70] However, the military 
in Pakistan have acted to protect not only their interests but Punjabi 
interests, whereas no single ethnic group dominates the Indian armed 
forces Further, Pakistan was in a more critical strategic situation than 
India, and its generals had developed direct foreign ties to military 
suppliers which gave them enhanced authority within Pakistan Finally, the 
Pakistani political system never put down as deep roots as India's, and the 
military there were certain that they could govern more effectively than 
the civilians The Indian armed forces have no such foreign ties and they 
are less confident than their Pakistani counterparts that they could govern 
their country
However, we must reiterate that the future role(s) of the Indian 
military may be different fron those of the past We conclude this chapter 
by noting where such changes may occur
A New Constitution?
The constitutionally-determined role of the Indian armed forces is 
quite narrow and specific The President remains the commander-in-chief 
while policy direction is provided by the prime minister One of the 
strengths of the present constitutional arrangement is that it provides 
some check to any prime minister tempted to politicize the military 
However, there are frequent discussions of a change m  this structure, 
moving towards elements of a French or American system m  which the 
presidency becomes a more 'political" office In such a system the 
military would find it even harder to resist efforts to politicize them,
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and to conform to a particular political or social ideology Any 
significant alteration in the Indian Constitution in this direction appears 
now to be unlikely, but if it were to occur, it would be in response to a 
sense of peripheral decay and central weakness in India's federal 
structure
Somewhat more likely is a gradual, even informal, modification of the 
Indian federal balance with the military and paramilitary forces as pawns 
in a subtle struggle for power This process has been underway for seme 
time, particularly in those Indian states with non-Congress governments 
They resist the introduction of the regular armed forces or centrally 
controlled paramilitary units, and have instead begun to create their own 
armed militias [71] They have the right to do so in order to maintain law 
and order (a state responsibility), but it has also been argued that this 
right is not absolute, and that the Union government has "overriding" law 
and order responsibilities [72] This controversy contains the seeds of 
intense Union-state conflict, up to and including serious violence, and if 
pressed to that point, further heavy military involvement m  the management 
of an Indian state
From Objective to Subjective Civilian Control?
If officers are further encouraged to conform to a dominant political 
and social ideology, and they do, they will compromise their conservative 
institutional perspective on national issues and begin to formulate 
political and social oositions of their own While this may suit the 
politicians in the short run, sooner or later it will lead to a divergence 
based on the corporate interests of the officer corps (at the very best),
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or a split in the officer corps, or the movement of the officer corps in 
directions more extreme than those now contemplated by the politicians 
The acceptable price of civilian control is a military with esssentially 
inward looking, conservative views In the past, this ethic was 
strengthened by the class origins of the officer corps, but now such views 
must be inculcated It is tempting to ask the military to serve political
ends —  increasingly as saviors of the law and order situation —  but each 
such request further politicizes the military by bringing them into too 
close contact with civilian society and by placing more and more civilian 
tasks in their hands And, while force is effective m  the short run it 
will also fail and the military will then blame their failure on civilians 
A controversy has grown up around the purported success or failure of 
"Operation Bluestar," with the military blaming poor civilian intelligence 
for their own problems in rooting out Bhindranwale and his supporters, the 
military apparently donanded —  and received —  a free hand when they were 
called out m  over forty Indian cities to control rioters after Mrs 
Gandhi's assassination, and have been fulsome in praise of their own 
operations as if to show the rest of India that they really could carry out 
a domestic military operation with speed and skill [73] It is true that 
these events are unprecedented and that disasters of this magnitude may 
never reoccur, but the rapid expansion of the army's role after Bluestar 
and the assassination suggest that the armed forces are on the edge of a
new activism
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Changes in the Strategic Environment?
The Indian armed forces have for years planned for war against two 
major powers, China and Pakistan, and prepare for minor conflicts against 
smaller neighbors Now, however, they find both superpowers increasingly 
interested in South Asia and face the prospect of regional nuclearization 
They have never had "enough" military hardware to deal with all possible 
security threats, and now these threats are multiplying The Indian armed 
forces are probably not big enough to mount an offensive strike against a 
major neighbor, but may be too big for a purely defensive strategy 
Further, the armed forces tend to emphasize the most dangerous element in 
every situation, partly out of a desire to persuade civilians that they are 
short of weapons and equipment Their motto, like many professional 
armies, is "more is enough"
There is scxne risk that their legitimate but exaggerated concern over 
weapons inferiority will lead them to an apocalyptic strategic perspective, 
and a search for political supporters within the Indian system This was 
impossible under a strong prime minister, but in a coalition or weak 
government it is likely that some in the military will attempt to trade 
their implicit support in exchange for additional equipment, better pay, 
and other benefits
Expansion of the Aid to the Civil Role'?
The expansion of the army’s law and order function is perhaps the most 
dangerous trend of all, from the point of view of military integrity and an 
expanding military role m  politics The past few years have seen a
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creeping military role, and m  the Punjab, Assam, and elsewhere "martial 
law' in all but name India is well below the threshold at which the 
military decides that it should rule if it is going to be asked to do so by 
civilians, but every additional aid to the civil operation brings it that 
much closer
Decline in Political Legitimacy'7
The armed forces operate at the margin of moral behavior, and their 
obedience to civilian authority will continue only as long as that 
authority is regarded as legitimate —  and hence legitimize the behavior of 
the military In a developed political system, such as India's, legitimacy 
is the consequence of effective performance in open and free elections and 
a degree of competence m  matters which directly affect the military In 
the case of Nehru and Mrs Gandhi, there was also a direct, even 
charismatic link to the jawans, NCOS and JCOs, over the heads of the 
officers No general could compare his own popularity with that of such 
leaders However, in the absence of such a charismatic leader, civilian 
legitimacy must be based on the actions of politically effective and 
administratively competent ministers who are able to protect the vital 
interests of the military and the state Civil servants cannot substitute 
for them, as they lack any mandate other than "civilian control," a mantra 
that will not survive genuine military concern
As for the future, it is yet to be seen whether the government of 
Rajiv Gandhi will be able to reverse a trend in which political legitimacy 
was increasingly personalized and thus increasingly vulnerable Nor is it 
self-evident that his government will be able to successfully resolve those
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foreign and domestic problems, most notably the Punjab crisis, which are 
least amenable to charismatic appeal, but which are viewed by the military 
as vital to their —  and India's —  survival
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